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| − | {{Infobox Military Conflict
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| − | |conflict=Attack on Pearl Harbor
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| − | |partof=the [[Pacific War|Pacific Theater]] of [[World War II]]
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| − | |image=[[Image:Pearl Harbor bombings map.jpg|300px]]
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| − | |caption=The attackers came in two waves. The first wave was detected by U.S. Army radar at {{convert|136|nmi|km|0}}, but was misidentified as USAAF bombers from the mainland.
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| − | |date=December 7, 1941
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| − | |place=primarily [[Pearl Harbor]], [[Hawaii]], [[USA]]
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| − | |result=Decisive Japanese victory; [[Infamy Speech|United States declares war on the Empire of Japan]] and enters [[World War II]] on the side of [[Allies]]; [[Tripartite Pact#Germany.27s declaration of war against the United States|Nazi Germany declares war on the United States]].
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| − | |casus=Oil and trade [[embargo]] by the [[United States]]; [[diplomacy|diplomatic]] stalemate between Japan and the US.
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| − | |combatant1={{flagicon|USA|1912}} [[United States]]
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| − | |combatant2={{flagicon|Japan|alt}} [[Empire of Japan]]
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| − | |commander1=Navy:<br />[[Husband Kimmel]]<br/>Army:<br />[[Walter Short]]
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| − | |commander2=Navy:<br />[[Chuichi Nagumo]]<br/>
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| − | |strength1=8 battleships,<br/> 8 cruisers,<br/> 29 destroyers,<br/> 9 submarines,<br/> ~50 other ships, <br/> ~390 aircraft
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| − | |strength2='''[[Carrier Striking Task Force|Striking Force]]:'''<br/>6 aircraft carriers,<br/>9 destroyers,<br/>2 battleships,<br/> 2 heavy cruisers,<br/>1 light cruiser,<br/> 8 tankers,<br/> 23 fleet submarines,<br/> 5 midget submarines,<br/> 414 aircraft
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| − | |casualties1=2 battleships sunk,<br/>6 battleships damaged,<br/>3 cruisers damaged,<br/>2 destroyers sunk, 1 damaged,<br/>1 other ship sunk, 3 damaged
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| − | |casualties2=4 midget submarines sunk, <br/> 1 midget submarine run aground, <br/>29 aircraft destroyed,<br/> 55 airmen, 9 submariners killed and 1 captured}}
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| − | {{Campaignbox Pacific 1941}}
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| − | {{Campaignbox Pacific Ocean}}
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| − | The '''attack on Pearl Harbor''' was a [[pre-emptive attack|pre-emptive]] [[military strike]] on the [[United States Pacific Fleet]] [[naval base|base]] at [[Pearl Harbor]], [[Hawaii]] by the [[Empire of Japan]]'s [[Imperial Japanese Navy]], on the morning of Sunday, 7 December, 1941. Two attack waves, totalling 350 aircraft were launched from six IJN [[aircraft carrier]]s which destroyed two [[U.S. Navy]] [[battleship]]s, one [[minelayer]], two destroyers and 188 aircraft. U. S. personnel losses totalled 2,333 killed and 1,139 wounded. Damaged warships included three cruisers, a destroyer, and six battleships. Of those six, one was deliberately grounded and was later refloated and repaired. Two sank at their berths but were later repaired and both rejoined the fleet late in the war. Vital fuel storage, shipyards, and submarine facilities were not hit. Japanese losses were minimal at 29 aircraft and five [[midget submarine]]s, with 65 Japanese servicemen killed or wounded.
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| − | The attack was one of the most important engagements of [[World War II]]. Occurring before a formal [[declaration of war]], it shocked the American public out of [[isolationism]]. Roosevelt called December 7, 1941 [[Infamy Speech|"… a date which will live in infamy."]] The result of the attack led to America's entry into the war and the defeat of both Nazi Germany and Imperialistic Japan. Both would be democratized and rebuilt through the [[Marshall Plan]].
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| − | ==Background to conflict==
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| − | {{main|Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor}}
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| − | More than a decade's worth of events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred prior to the actual engagement. War between [[Japan]] and the [[United States]] had been a possibility that each nation's militaries planned for since the 1920s, though real tension did not begin until the 1931 invasion of Manchuria by Japan. Over the next decade, Japan expanded slowly into [[China]], leading to all out war between the two in 1937. In 1940 Japan invaded [[Invasion of French Indochina|French Indochina]] in an effort to embargo all imports into China, including war supplies purchased from the US. This move prompted an eventual American embargo on exporting oil to Japan, which in turn led the Japanese to execute an attack on [[Pearl Harbor]], ensuring the US fleet would be unable to interfere with their simultaneous invasion of the [[Dutch East Indies]] for its oil and other resources as part of the [[Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere]] Japan envisioned in the Pacific.
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| − | Preliminary planning for an attack had begun in very early 1941, initially by [[Isoroku Yamamoto]]. After much contention with Naval Headquarters, permission was finally given for full scale planning by early spring 1941. Over the next months, pilots were trained, equipment prepared. Despite the preparation, the actual order to attack was not given until December 1st, after it was apparent all diplomacy would not resolve matters acceptably to the Japanese.
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| − | The pre-emptive strike's intent was to protect Imperial Japan's advance into [[Malaya]] and the [[Dutch East Indies]]—for their natural resources such as [[petroleum|oil]] and rubber—by neutralizing the U.S. [[United States Pacific Fleet|Pacific Fleet]]. Both the US and Japan had long-standing contingency plans for war in the Pacific, developed during the 1930s as tension between the two countries steadily increased, focusing on the other's [[battleship]]s. Japan's expansion into Manchuria and later French Indochina were greeted with increasing levels of embargoes and sanctions from the [[United States]]. In 1940, the US halted further shipments of airplanes, parts, machine tools and aviation gas to Japan, which Japan interpreted as an unfriendly act.<ref>[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/Peace%20and%20War.html Peace and War United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941] Retrieved November 25, 2007.</ref> America continued to export oil to Japan, as it was understood in Washington that cutting off exports could mean Japanese retaliation. In the summer of 1941, the US ceased the export of oil to Japan due to Japan's continued aggressive expansionist policy and because an anticipated eventual American entrance to the war in Europe prompted increased stockpiling and less commercial use of gasoline. [[President of the United States|President]] [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] had moved the fleet to [[Hawaii]], and ordered a buildup in the [[Philippines]], to reduce Japanese aggression in China and deter operations against others, including [[Europe]]an colonies in Asia. The Japanese high command was certain any attack on the [[United Kingdom]]'s colonies would inevitably bring the U.S. into the war.<ref>Peattie & Evans</ref> A pre-emptive strike appeared the only way Japan could avoid U.S. interference in the Pacific.
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| − | ==Approach and attack==
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| − | [[Image:Lt.Com Mitsuo Fuchida.jpg|170px|thumb|right|Captain [[Mitsuo Fuchida]]]]
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| − | ===First wave===
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| − | The first attack wave consisted of 49 B5Ns, 51 D3As, 40 B5Ns, and 43 A6Ms (a total of 183 aircraft), launched north of Oahu, commanded by [[Captain]] [[Mitsuo Fuchida]]. It comprised:
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| − | * '''1st Group'''
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| − | ** 50 [[Nakajima B5N]]s armed with 800 [[Kilogram|kg]] (1760 [[pound (mass)|lb]]) [[armor piercing bomb]]s, in four sections.
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| − | ** 40 B5Ns armed with [[Type 91 torpedo]]es, also in four sections.
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| − | * '''2nd Group''' - 55 [[Aichi D3A]]s armed with {{Auto lb|550|0}} general purpose bombs
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| − | ** 27 D3As - Hangars and aircraft on [[Ford Island]]
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| − | ** 27 D3As - Hangars and aircraft on [[Wheeler Field]]
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| − | * '''3rd Group''' - 45 A6Ms for air control and [[strafe|strafing]], divided into three sections:
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| − | ** 18 A6Ms - Ford Island and Hickam Field
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| − | ** 15 A6Ms - Wheeler Field and Barbers Point
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| − | ** 12 A6M - [[Marine Corps Base Hawaii|Kāne{{okina}}ohe Marine Corps Air Station]]
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| − | The first attack wave divided into 3 groups. One unit went to [[Wheeler Field]]. Each of the aerial waves started with the [[bomber]]s and ended with the fighters to deter pursuit.
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| − | At 03.42 [[Hawaii-Aleutian Standard Time Zone|Hawaiian Time]], even before Nagumo began launching, the [[Minesweeper (ship)|minesweeper]] [[USS Condor (AMc-14)|USS ''Condor'']] spotted a midget submarine outside the harbor entrance and alerted destroyer [[USS Ward (DD-139)|USS ''Ward'']]. ''Ward'' carried out an unsuccessful search. The [[First American shots fired in World War II|first shots fired]], and the first casualties in the attack, occurred when ''Ward'' eventually attacked and sank a midget submarine, possibly the same one, at 06:37.
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| − | [[Image:Pearlmap2.png|thumb|left|350 px|[[Image:Phdepth.png|350 px]]Targets:<br />1:[[w:USS California (BB-44)|USS ''California'']] 2:[[w:USS Maryland (BB-46)|USS ''Maryland'']] 3:[[w:USS Oklahoma (BB-37)|USS ''Oklahoma'']] 4:[[w:USS Tennessee (BB-43)|USS ''Tennessee'']]<br/> 5:[[w:USS West Virginia (BB-48)|USS ''West Virginia'']]
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| − | 6:[[w:USS Arizona (BB-39)|USS ''Arizona'']] 7:[[w:USS Nevada (BB-36)|USS ''Nevada'']] 8:[[w:USS Pennsylvania (BB-38)|USS ''Pennsylvania'']] 9:[[w:Ford Island|Ford Island NAS]] 10:[[w:Hickam Air Force Base|Hickam field]]<br/>Ignored:<br/>
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| − | A:Oil storage tanks B:CINCPAC C:Submarine base
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| − | D:Naval yard]]
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| − | Five midget submarines had been assigned to [[torpedo]] U.S. ships after the bombing started. None of these returned, and only four have since been found. Of the ten sailors aboard, nine died; the only survivor, [[Kazuo Sakamaki]], was captured, becoming the first Japanese [[prisoner of war]].<ref>[http://www.usni.org/navalhistory/Articles99/Nhrodgaard.htm Pearl Harbor—Attack from Below] Retrieved November 25, 2007.</ref>
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| − | On the morning of the attack, the Army's [[Opana Radar Site|Opana Point]] station (an [[SCR-270 radar]], located near the northern tip of Oahu, which had been in training mode for months and had not entered official service), detected the first wave of Japanese planes and called in a warning. Although the operators at Opana Point reported a target echo larger than anything they had ever seen, an untrained new officer at the new and only partially activated Intercept Center, Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, presumed the scheduled arrival of six B-17 bombers was the cause because of the direction from which the aircraft were coming (only a few degrees separated the two inbound courses);<ref>Prange p.98.</ref> because he presumed the operators had never seen a formation as large as the U.S. bombers' on radar;<ref>''ibid.'', p.97.</ref> and possibly because the operators had only seen the lead element of the incoming attack.
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| − | Several U.S. aircraft were shot down as the first wave approached land; one at least radioed a somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings from ships off the harbor entrance were still being processed, or awaiting confirmation, when the planes began bombing and strafing. Nevertheless, it is not clear any warnings would have had much effect even had they been interpreted correctly and much more promptly. The results the Japanese achieved in the [[Philippines]] were essentially the same as at Pearl Harbor, though [[Douglas MacArthur|MacArthur]] had almost nine hours warning the Japanese had attacked at Pearl (and specific orders to commence operations) before they actually struck his command.
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| − | The air portion of the attack on Pearl Harbor began at 7:48 a.m. December 7 Hawaiian Time (3:18 a.m. December 8 [[Japanese Standard Time]], as kept by ships of the ''Kido Butai''), with the attack on Kaneohe.<ref>''ibid.'', p.174.</ref> Japanese planes attacked in two waves; a total of 353 planes reached O{{okina}}ahu. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers attacked U.S. air bases across O{{okina}}ahu, starting with Hickam Field, the largest, and Wheeler Field, the main AAC fighter base. The 170 planes in the second wave attacked the Air Corps' [[Bellows Field]] near Kaneohe on the windward side of the island, and [[Ford Island]]. The only significant air opposition came from a handful of [[P-36 Hawk]]s and [[P-40 Warhawk]]s that flew 25 [[sortie]]s.
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| − | [[Image:USS California sinking-Pearl Harbor.jpg|thumb|222px|right|[[USS California (BB-44)|USS ''California'']] sinking]]
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| − | Men aboard U.S. ships awoke to the sounds of bombs exploding and cries of "Away fire and rescue party" and "All hands on deck, we're being bombed" and other various calls to General Quarters. (The famous message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not drill.",<ref> Beloite and Beloite</ref> was sent from the headquarters of Patrol Wing Two, the first senior level Hawaiian command to respond.) Despite a lack of readiness, which included locked ammunition lockers, aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip to prevent sabotage, and no heightened alert status, and on at least one battleship, all watertight doors open throughout the ship in preparation for an inspection, many American military personnel served with distinction during the battle. Rear Admiral [[Isaac C. Kidd]], and Captain [[Franklin Van Valkenburgh]], commander of [[USS Arizona (BB-39)|USS ''Arizona'']], both rushed to the bridge to direct her defense, until both were killed by an explosion in the forward magazine from an armor piercing bomb hit next to turret two. Both were posthumously awarded the [[Medal of Honor]]. Ensign Joe Taussig got his ship, [[USS Nevada (BB-36)|USS ''Nevada'']], underway from a dead cold start during the attack. One of the destroyers, [[USS Aylwin (DD-355)|USS ''Aylwin'']], got underway with only four officers aboard, all Ensigns, none with more than a year's sea duty. That ship operated at sea for four days before her commanding officer managed to get aboard. Captain [[Mervyn Bennion]], commanding [[USS West Virginia (BB-48)|USS ''West Virginia'']] (Kimmel's flagship), led his men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb hit in [[USS Tennessee (BB-43)|USS ''Tennessee'']], moored alongside.
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| − | Gallantry was widespread. In all, 14 officers and sailors were awarded the [[Medal of Honor]]. A special [[Awards and decorations of the United States military|military award]], the [[Pearl Harbor Commemorative Medal]], was later authorized for all military veterans of the attack.
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| − | ===Second wave composition===
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| − | [[Image:Carrier shokaku.jpg|thumb|right|222px|Fighter Combat Units (Mitsubishi A6M Zeros) preparing to take off from [[aircraft carrier]] ''[[Shokaku]]'' for Pearl Harbor]]
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| − | The second wave consisted of 54 B5Ns, 78 D3As, and 35 A6Ms (a total of 167), launched from much the same location, commanded by [[Lieutenant-Commander]] [[Shigekazu Shimazaki]]. This wave and its targets comprised:
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| − | * '''1st Group''' - 54 B5Ns armed with general purpose bombs
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| − | ** 27 B5Ns - Aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island and Barbers Point
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| − | ** 27 B5N - Hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field
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| − | * '''2nd Group'''
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| − | ** 78 D3As armed with general purpose bombs, in four sections
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| − | * '''3rd Group''' - 36 A6Ms for defense and strafing
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| − | ** 9 A6M - Ford Island
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| − | ** 9 A6M - Hickam Field
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| − | ** 9 A6M - Wheeler Field
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| − | ** 9 A6M - MCAS Kāne{{okina}}ohe
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| − | The second wave was divided into three groups. One unit was tasked to attack Kāne{{okina}}ohe, the rest Pearl Harbor proper. The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously, from several directions.
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| − | Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. 2,386 Americans died (55 were civilians, most killed by unexploded American anti-aircraft shells landing in civilian areas), a further 1,139 wounded. Eighteen ships were sunk, including five battleships.
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| − | [[Image:NARA 28-1277a.gif|thumb|222px|right|[[Boeing B-17|B-17]] after the attack on Hickam Field.]]
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| − | [[Image:Pennsylvania-cassin-downes.jpg|thumb|222px|right|[[USS Pennsylvania (BB-38)|USS ''Pennsylvania'']], behind the wreckage of the [[USS Downes (DD-375)|USS ''Downes'']] and [[USS Cassin (DD-372)|USS ''Cassin''.]]]]
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| − | Nearly half of the 1102 American fatalities were caused by the explosion and sinking of [[USS Arizona (BB-39)|USS ''Arizona'']], the result of her forward [[powder magazine|magazine]] exploding after it was hit by a modified 40 cm (16in) shell.
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| − |
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| − | ''Nevada'' attempted to exit the harbor, but was deliberately beached to avoid blocking the harbor entrance. Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire forward, ''Nevada'' was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she got underway, sustaining more hits from 250 lb (113 kg) bombs as she beached.
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| − | [[USS California (BB-44)|USS ''California'']] was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from ''Arizona'' and ''West Virginia'' drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look worse than it was. The disarmed target ship [[USS Utah (BB-31)|USS ''Utah'']] was holed twice by torpedoes. [[USS West Virginia (BB-48)|USS ''West Virginia'']] was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away her rudder. [[USS Oklahoma (BB-37)|USS ''Oklahoma'']] was hit by four torpedoes, the last two above her belt armor, which caused her to [[capsize]]. [[USS Maryland (BB-46)|USS ''Maryland'']] was hit by two of the converted 40 cm shells, but neither caused serious damage.
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| − | Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels present), they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser [[USS Helena (CL-50)|USS ''Helena'']] was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the neighboring minelayer [[USS Oglala (CM-4)|USS ''Oglala'']]. Two destroyers in dry dock were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel [[bunker]]s. The leaking fuel caught fire, flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight fire made the burning oil rise, and so the ships were burned out. The light cruiser [[USS Raleigh (CL-7)|USS ''Raleigh'']] was holed by a torpedo. The light cruiser [[USS Honolulu (CL-48)|USS ''Honolulu'']] was damaged but remained in service. The destroyer [[USS Cassin (DD-372)|USS ''Cassin'']] capsized, and destroyer [[USS Downes (DD-375)|USS ''Downes'']] was heavily damaged. The repair vessel [[USS Vestal (AR-4)|USS ''Vestal'']], moored alongside ''Arizona'', was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane tender [[USS Curtiss (AV-4)|USS ''Curtiss'']] was also damaged. [[USS Shaw (DD-373)|USS ''Shaw'']] was badly damaged when two bombs penetrated her forward magazine.<ref>[http://www.destroyerhistory.org/goldplater/danfs373.html USS Shaw] Retrieved November 25, 2007.</ref>
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| − | [[Image:USS Shaw Exploding.jpg|thumb|222px|right|Destroyer [[USS Shaw (DD-373)|USS ''Shaw'']] exploding after her forward magazine was detonated]]
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| − | Almost all of the 188 American aircraft in Hawaii were destroyed or damaged, 155 of those on the ground. Almost none were actually ready to take off to defend the base, having been parked wingtip to wingtip as a sabotage protection measure. Of 33 PBYs in Hawaii, 24 were destroyed, and six others damaged beyond repair. (The three on patrol returned undamaged.) Attacks on barracks killed additional personnel. Friendly fire brought down several U.S. planes, including some from an inbound flight from [[USS Enterprise (CV-6)|USS ''Enterprise'']].
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| − | Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the action. Of Japan's 387<ref>[http://www.ww2pacific.com/aaf41.html WW II Pacific, Dec 7, 1941 Aircraft at Pearl Harbor] Retrieved November 25, 2007.</ref> available planes (350 took part in the attack), 29 were lost during the battle (nine in the first attack wave, 20 in the second) with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft fire from the ground.
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| − | ===Possible third wave===
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| − | Several Japanese junior officers, including Fuchida and Genda, urged Admiral Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to destroy as much of Pearl Harbor's fuel storage, maintenance, and dry dock facilities as possible.<ref>Gailey, Harry A. ''The War in the Pacific From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay''. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995. p.68 ISBN 9780891414865</ref> Some military historians have suggested the destruction of these oil tanks and repair facilities would have crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet far more seriously than did loss of its battleships. If they had been wiped out, "serious [American] operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year."<ref>Gailey pp.97-98</ref> Nagumo, however, decided to forgo a third attack in favor of withdrawal for several reasons:
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| − | [[Image:Chuichi Nagumo.jpg|230px|right|thumb|[[Admiral]] [[Chuichi Nagumo]], commander of the [[Carrier Striking Task Force]]]]
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| − | *American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two-thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave (20 out of 29 lost planes).<ref>Edwin P. Hoyt, ''Pearl Harbor'', G.K. Hall & Co., 1991, p.190</ref> Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three-quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the port facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.<ref>Hoyt p.190</ref>
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| − | *The location of the American carriers remained unknown to Nagumo. In addition, the Admiral was concerned his force was now within range of American land-based bombers.<ref>Hoyt p.190</ref> Nagumo was uncertain whether the U.S. had enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an attack against Japan's carriers.<ref>Hoyt p.191</ref>
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| − | *A third wave attack would have required substantial preparation and turn-around time, and would have meant returning planes would have faced night landings. At the time, no Navy had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.
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| − | *The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer since he was at the very limits of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers ''en route'' home.<ref>Prange</ref>
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| − | *He believed the second strike had essentially satisfied the main objective of his mission—the neutralization of the Pacific Fleet—and did not wish to risk further losses.<ref>Gailey p.97.</ref>
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| − | At a conference aboard ''Yamato'' the following morning, Yamamoto initially supported Nagumo's decision to withdraw.<ref>''ibid.''</ref> In retrospect, however, Nagumo's decision to spare the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and oil depots meant the U.S. could respond relatively quickly to Japanese activities in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's decision and categorically stated it had been a great mistake not to order a third strike.<ref>Gailey p.98.</ref>
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| − | ==Aftermath==
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| − | ===American response===
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| − | [[Image:Franklin Roosevelt signing declaration of war against Japan December 1941.jpg|thumb|222px|right|President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] signing the Declaration of War against Japan on the day following the attack]]
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| − | On December 8, 1941, Roosevelt addressed a joint session of Congress, calling December 7, 1941 "a date which will live in infamy." Amid outrage at the attack and the late delivery of the note breaking off relations, actions considered treacherous, Congress [[declaration of war by the United States|declared war on Japan]] with [[Jeannette Rankin]] ([[Republican Party (United States)|Republican]] of [[Montana]]) casting the only dissenting vote. Roosevelt signed the declaration the same day. Continuing to intensify its military mobilization, the [[Government of the United States|U.S. government]] finished converting to a [[war economy]], a process begun by [[Lend Lease|provision of weapons]] to the [[Soviet Union]] and [[United Kingdom|Great Britain]].
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| − | The Pearl Harbor attack immediately galvanized a divided nation into action. Public opinion had been moving towards support for entering the war during 1941, but considerable opposition remained until the Pearl Harbor attack. Overnight, Americans united against Japan, and probably made possible the [[unconditional surrender]] position later taken by the [[Allies|Allied Powers]]. Some historians believe the attack on Pearl Harbor doomed Japan to defeat simply because it awakened the "sleeping beast," regardless of whether the fuel depots or machine shops had been destroyed or even if the carriers had been caught in port and sunk. U.S. industrial and military capacity, once mobilized, was able to pour overwhelming resources into both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters. Others believe Japanese [[convoy|trade protection]] was so incompetent, U.S. submarines could have strangled Japan into defeat alone.
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| − | Perceptions of treachery in the attack before a declaration of war sparked fears of sabotage or espionage by Japanese sympathizers residing in the U.S., including [[Japanese Americans|citizens of Japanese descent]] and was a factor in the subsequent [[Japanese internment in the United States|Japanese internment]] in the western United States. Other factors included misrepresentations of intelligence information (none) suggesting sabotage, notably by [[John L. DeWitt|General John DeWitt]], commanding Coast Defense on the Pacific Coast, who had personal feelings against Japanese Americans.<ref>[http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=323&invol=214#fff2 ''Korematsu v. United States''] Retrieved November 25, 2007.</ref> In February 1942, Roosevelt signed [[United States Executive Order 9066]], requiring all [[Japanese American]]s to submit themselves for an [[internment]].
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| − | ===Germany declares war===
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| − | Nazi Germany and [[Fascism|Fascist]] [[Italy]] declared war on the United States on December 11, allowing the US to formally enter the war in Europe. [[Adolf Hitler]] and [[Benito Mussolini]] were under no obligation to declare war under the mutual defense terms of the Tripartite Pact. However, relations between the European Axis Powers and the [[United States]] had deteriorated since 1937. Earlier in 1941, the Nazis learned of the U.S. military's contingency planning to get troops in Continental Europe by 1943; this was [[Rainbow Five]], made public by sources unsympathetic to Roosevelt's [[New Deal]], and published by the ''[[Chicago Tribune]]''. Hitler decided war with the United States was unavoidable, and the Pearl Harbor attack, the publication of Rainbow Five, and Roosevelt's post-Pearl Harbor address, which focused on European affairs as well as the situation with Japan, probably contributed to the declaration. Hitler underestimated American military production capacity, the nation's ability to fight on two fronts, and the time his own [[Operation Barbarossa|Operation <small>BARBAROSSA</small>]] would require. Similarly, the Nazis may have hoped the declaration of war, a showing of solidarity with Japan, would result in closer collaboration with the Japanese in [[Eurasia]], particularly against the [[Soviet Union]]. Regardless of Hitler's reasons, the decision was an enormous strategic blunder and allowed the United States to enter the European war in support of the [[United Kingdom]] and the Allies without much public opposition.
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| − | Hitler awarded [[Imperial Japan]]ese ambassador to [[Nazi Germany]] [[Hiroshi Oshima]] the [[Order of the German Eagle|Grand Cross of the Order of the German Eagle in Gold]] (1st class) after the attack, praising Japan for striking hard and without first declaring war.<ref>Trial transcripts at Nuremberg 11 December 1945. More details of the exchanges at the meeting are available online at [http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-02/tgmwc-02-16-09.shtml nizkor.org]</ref>
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| − | ===Logistical and strategic analysis===
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| − | [[Image:PearlHarborCarrierChart.jpg|thumb|240px|right|Carrier Striking Task Force two-way route. Legend:{{legend|#000000|
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| − | [[Attack on Pearl Harbor order of battle|''Kido Butai'']]}}
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| − | {{legend|#FF0000|[[USS Enterprise (CV-6)]]}}
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| − | {{legend|#0000FF|[[USS Lexington (CV-2)]]}}]]
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| − | The attack on Pearl Harbor failed to sight or destroy any of the Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers; they had been, along with USN capital ships, primary targets.<ref name="IJN97">[http://ibiblio.org/pha/monos/097/index.html Japanese Monograph Number 97] Pearl Harbor operation Prepared by Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East from ibiblio.org/pha.</ref> The carriers ''Lexington'' and ''Enterprise'' were ferrying additional fighters to American bases on the islands of [[Wake Island|Wake]] and [[Midway Island|Midway]].<ref>Richard Holmes, ''The World Atlas of Warfare: Military Innovations that Changed the Course of History'' (Viking, 1988), p.211.</ref> At the time of the Japanese attack, the US was expecting imminent war with Japan, beginning in any of several places, such as the [[Philippines]] or Allied bases in Borneo.<ref name=''272337''>[http://ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411127acno.html War warning, dated 27 November 1941] The involvement of numerous units of the Japanese Army and the apparent disposition of IJN forces suggested amphibious operations against either the Philippines Thai or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo, which was the reason warning cables had been sent ot all Pacific commands by both the Navy and War Deparments at Washington. </ref> The attack at Pearl resulted in the permanent loss of ''Arizona'' and ''Oklahoma'', and removed several other battleships (including ''Nevada'', ''West Virginia'', and ''California'') from the battle line for months. However, all of these were older designs, too slow to serve as escorts for the carrier [[task forces]] which became central to the Pacific War, and so in practice, the most immediate consequences of the attack were the destruction of over 155 aircraft and shock to American pride.
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| − | Genda's plan and Nagumo's execution, left the shore installations at Pearl Harbor almost untouched, excluding aircraft hangars. The ''Arizona'' was sunk and beyond repair. Its hull underlies the Arizona Memorial. The ''Oklahoma'' capsized, was raised, stripped of guns and superstructure, sold for scrap and sunk under tow to San Francisco Bay in 1947. These were the only battleships lost that day. ''California'', ''Tennessee'', ''West Virginia'', ''Maryland'', ''Nevada'', and ''Pennsylvania'' were repaired and would later exact some revenge on Japanese battleships during the [[Battle of Leyte Gulf#Battle of Surigao Strait|Battle of Surigao Strait]]. [[Cruisers]], essential to carrier task forces later in the war, had been considered tertiary targets and only three suffered damage. Of 27 [[destroyers]] present, only two were lost: ''Cassin'', and ''Downes''. (Even so, machinery, stores, and weapons were salvaged from all ships written off.)
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| − | Tank farms, containing 140 million gallons (530 million liters) of bunker oil, were unscathed providing a ready source of fuel for American submarines at the submarine base. Critical to the initial phase of the War and to commerce raiding throughout, these facilities would later illustrate the folly in Japanese planning. The Navy Yard, critical to ship maintenance, and repair of ships damaged in the attack was left undamaged. The engineering and initial repair shops, as well as the torpedo store, <!-- don't correct this. "store" is proper usage—> were intact. Other items of base infrastructure and operation such as the power station continued to operate. Also critical, the cryptanalysis unit, [[Station Hypo|<small>HYPO</small>]], located in the basement of the old Administration Building, was undamaged and actually benefited by gaining staff from unemployed ship's bands.<ref>Willmott, ''op. cit.''; Blair, ''op. cit.''; Beach, ''Submarine!''; Holmes, ''Double-Edged Secrets'' and ''Undersea Victory''.</ref>
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| − | The Army Air Force's loss of aircraft must be balanced against the fact that many of them were obsolete, such as the P-40's ancestor, the [[Curtiss P-36|P-36]]. Japan might have achieved a good deal more with not much additional effort or loss.<ref>Caidin, ''op. cit.'' and ''Fork-Tailed Devil'' (Ballantine, 1968).</ref>
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| − | Nagumo's hesitation, and failure to find and destroy the American carriers, may have been a product of his lack of faith in the attack plan, and of the fact he was a gunnery officer, not an aviator. In addition, Yamamoto's targeting priorities, placing battleships first in importance, reflected an out-of-date [[Alfred Mahan|Mahan]]ian [[doctrine]], and an inability to extrapolate from history, given the damage German submarines did to British trade in [[World War I]]. In the end, [[Japan]] achieved surprisingly little for all her daring and apparent success.<ref>Willmott, ''op. cit.''; Peattie and Evans, ''op. cit.''.</ref>
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| − | The politics of a "Europe First" strategy, loss of air cover over Pearl Harbor, and subsequent loss of the [[Philippines#Japanese invasion|Philippines]], meant the U.S. Army and Army Air Corps were unable to play a significant role in the [[Pacific War]] for several months. Japan was temporarily free of worries about the major rival Pacific naval power, which was at least part of what had been intended for the attack. Because Australian, New Zealand, Dutch and most British forces were already in Europe, Japan conquered Southeast Asia, the Southwest Pacific, and extended her reach far into the [[Indian Ocean]], without significant interference. The various Japanese advances were a nearly complete tactical success.
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| − | In retrospect, the attack was a strategic disaster for [[Japan]]. It spurred the [[United States]] into a determination to fight to complete victory. The War resulted in the destruction of the Japanese armed forces, the Occupation of the Home Islands (a state never before achieved in Japan's history), and the loss of [[United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands|Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands]] to the United States until 1972, while the Soviet Russian re-annexation of the [[Kurile islands]] and [[Sakhalin Island|Sakhalin Island's]] southern part, and China's seizure of [[Taiwan|Formosa (Taiwan)]], and the loss of [[Korea]] have not been reversed to this day.
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| − | {{multicol|100%}}
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| − | {| Class = "wikitable"
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| − | |+ <u>Capital ships prior to attack</u><ref name="NP">[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/forces.html Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Pt. 15,] p. 1901-06 from http://www.ibiblio.org</ref>
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| − | ! Location !! Battleships !! Aircraft carriers
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| − | |-
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| − | | colspan = 3 | <div style="text-align: center;">[[Image:US Naval Jack 48 stars.svg|23 px]] '''United States''' [[Image:US flag 48 stars.svg|23 px]] </div>
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| − | |-
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| − | | Atlantic
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| − | | 6 (8*)
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| − | | 4 (5*)
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| − | |-
| |
| − | | Pacific
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| − | | 9
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| − | | 3
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| − | |-
| |
| − | | colspan = 3 | <div style="text-align: center;">{{flagicon|Japan|naval}} '''Empire of Japan''' {{flagicon|Japan}} </div>
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| − | |-
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| − | | Pacific
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| − | | 10 (11*)
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| − | | 9
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| − | |-
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| − | |colspan = 3 | <small>*Including ships completed but not yet commissioned. <br />US: ''North Carolina'', ''Washington'' and ''Hornet''<br />Japan: ''Yamato''</small>
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| − | |}
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| − | {{multicol-break}}
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| − | {| Class = "wikitable"
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| − | |+ <u>Capital ships after attack</u>
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| − | ! Location !! Battleships !! Aircraft carriers
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| − | |-
| |
| − | | colspan = 3 | <div style="text-align: center;">[[Image:US Naval Jack 48 stars.svg|23 px]] '''United States''' [[Image:US flag 48 stars.svg|23 px]] </div>
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| − | |-
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| − | | Atlantic
| |
| − | | 6 (8*)
| |
| − | | 4 (5*)
| |
| − | |-
| |
| − | | Pacific
| |
| − | | 1 (6**)
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| − | | 3
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| − | |-
| |
| − | | colspan = 3 | <div style="text-align: center;">{{flagicon|Japan|naval}} '''Empire of Japan''' {{flagicon|Japan}} </div>
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| − | |-
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| − | | Pacific
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| − | | 10 (11*)
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| − | | 9
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| − | |-
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| − | |colspan = 3 | <small>**Ships which can be repaired.</small>
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| − | |}
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| − | {{multicol-break}}
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| − | {| Class = "wikitable"
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| − | |+ <u>Capital ships 12/1942</u>
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| − | ! Location !! Battleships !! Aircraft carriers
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| − | |-
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| − | | colspan = 3 | <div style="text-align: center;">[[Image:US Naval Jack 48 stars.svg|23 px]] '''United States''' [[Image:US flag 48 stars.svg|23 px]] </div>
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| − | |-
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| − | | Atlantic
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| − | | 4
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| − | | 1
| |
| − | |-
| |
| − | | Pacific
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| − | | 12 (3**)
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| − | | 3
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| − | |-
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| − | | colspan = 3 | <div style="text-align: center;">{{flagicon|Japan|naval}} '''Empire of Japan''' {{flagicon|Japan}} </div>
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| − | |-
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| − | | Pacific
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| − | | 10
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| − | | 6
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| − | |-
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| − | |colspan = 3 | <small>**Ships which can be repaired.<br />US ships lost:<br />''Lexington'', ''Yorktown'', ''Wasp'', ''Hornet''<br />US ships gained:''Essex'', ''North Carolina'', ''Washington'', ''South Dakota'', ''Indiana'', ''Massachusetts'', ''Alabama''<br />Japanese ships lost:<br />''Shoho'', ''Akagi'', ''Kaga'', ''Soryu'', ''Hiryu'', ''Hiei'', ''Kirishima''<br />Japanese ships gained: ''Yamato'', ''Mushashi'', ''Junyo'', ''Hiyo''.</small>
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| − | |}
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| − | {{multicol-end}}
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| − |
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| − | ===Investigations and blame===
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| − | President Roosevelt appointed an investigating [[Roberts Commission|commission]], headed by U.S. Supreme Court Justice [[Owen Josephus Roberts|Owen Roberts]] to report facts and findings with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was the first of many official investigations (nine in all). Both the Fleet commander, Rear Admiral [[Husband E. Kimmel]], and the Army commander, Lieutenant General [[Walter Short]] (the Army had been responsible for air defense of Hawaii, including Pearl Harbor, and for general defense of the islands against hostile attack), were relieved of their commands shortly thereafter. They were accused of "dereliction of duty" by the Roberts Commission for not making reasonable defensive preparations. None of the investigations conducted during the War, nor the Congressional investigation afterward, provided enough reason to reverse those actions. The decisions of the Navy and War Departments to relieve both was controversial at the time and has remained so. However, neither was court-martialed as would normally have been the result of dereliction of duty. On May 25, 1999, the U.S. Senate voted to recommend both officers be exonerated on all charges, citing "denial to Hawaii commanders of vital intelligence available in Washington."
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| − | ==Japanese views==
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| − | <!-- Commented out because image was deleted: [[Image:JapanPropaganda.jpg|thumb|222px|right|Japanese propaganda caricature map from around 1941, depicting a U.S. blockade of Japan from the [[Philippines]] (then a U.S. possession)]] —>
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| − | [[Image:9submariners.jpg|thumb|right|222px|Japanese depiction of nine midget submarine crewmembers lost during the attack, excluding the POW, [[Kazuo Sakamaki]].]]
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| − | Although the Imperial Japanese government had made some effort to prepare their population for war ''via'' anti-U.S. [[propaganda]], it appears most Japanese were surprised, apprehensive, and dismayed by the news they were now at war with the U.S., a country many Japanese admired. Nevertheless, the people at home and overseas thereafter generally accepted their government's account of the attack and supported the war effort until their nation's surrender in 1945.<ref>Robert Guillain, ''I saw Tokyo burning: An eyewitness narrative from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima'' (J. Murray, 1981). ISBN 0-7195-3862-9</ref>
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| − | Japan's national leadership at the time appeared to have believed war between the U.S. and Japan had long been inevitable. In any case, Japanese-American relationships had already significantly deteriorated since Japan's invasion of China beginning in the early '30s, of which the United States strongly disapproved. In 1942, [[Saburo Kurusu]], former Japanese ambassador to the United States, gave an address in which he talked about the "historical inevitability of the war of Greater East Asia."<ref>[[Saburo Kurusu]], http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/421126a.html Historical inevitability of the war of Greater East Asia], Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Tokyo, November 26, 1942 (accessed June 10, 2005).</ref> He said war had been a response to Washington's longstanding aggression toward Japan. For example, provocations against Japan included the [[Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907|San Francisco School incident]], (the United States' [[racism|racist]] policies on [[Japanese American|Japanese immigrants]]), Naval Limitations Treaty, other [[Unequal treaties]], the [[Nine Power Pact]], constant economic pressure against Japan, culminating in the "belligerent" [[scrap metal]] and oil embargo in 1941 by the United States and [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] countries to contain and/or reverse the actions of the Empire of Japan especially in IndoChina during her expansion of influence and interests throughout [[Asia]]. In light of Japan's dependence on imported oil, the trade embargoes were especially significant. These pressures directly influenced Japan to go into alliance with [[Nazi Germany|Germany]] and [[Italian fascism|Italy]] through the [[Tripartite Pact]]. According to Kurusu, because of these reasons, the Allies had already provoked war with Japan long before the attack at Pearl Harbor, and the United States was already preparing for war with Japan. Kurusu also states the United States was also looking for world domination, beyond just Asia, with "sinister designs" <ref>[[Saburo Kurusu]], http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/421126a.html Historical inevitability of the war of Greater East Asia], Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Tokyo, November 26, 1942 (accessed June 10, 2005).</ref>. Some of this view seems to have been shared by [[Adolf Hitler]], when he called it one of the reasons Germany declared war on the United States. He also had mentioned [[Europe]]an [[imperialism]] toward Japan many years before. Therefore, according to Kurusu, Japan had no choice but to defend herself and so should rapidly continue to militarize, bring [[Germany]] and [[Italy]] closer as allies and militarily combat the United States, Britain, and the [[Netherlands]].
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| − |
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| − | Japan's leaders also saw herself as justified in her conduct, believing that they are building the [[Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere]]. They also explained Japan had done everything possible to alleviate tension between the two nations. The decision to attack, at least for public presentation, was reluctant and forced on Japan. Of the Pearl Harbor attack itself, Kurusu said it came in direct response to a virtual ultimatum from the U.S. government, the [[Hull note]], and so the surprise attack was not treacherous. Since the Japanese-American relationship already had hit its lowest point, there was no alternative; in any case, had an acceptable settlement of differences been reached, the [[Carrier Striking Task Force]] could have been called back.
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| − | ===Perception of the attack today===
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| − | [[Image:Japanpilotdrawing.jpg|thumb|222px|right|Drawing found in the wreckage of one of the Japanese planes. It reads, "Hear the voice of the moment of death! Wake up you fools! You damned go to the devil!"]]
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| − | Some Japanese today still feel they were compelled to fight because of threats to their national interests and an embargo imposed by the United States, the [[United Kingdom]] and the [[Netherlands]]. The most important embargo was on oil on which its Navy and much of the economy was dependent.<ref>Cook, Haruko Taya, and Theodore Failor Cook. ''Japan at War An Oral History''. New York: New Press, 1992. ISBN 9781565840140</ref> The ''[[Japan Times]]'', an English-language newspaper owned by one of the major news organizations in Japan (Asahi Shimbun), ran numerous columns in the early 2000s echoing Kurusu's comments in reference to the Pearl Harbor attack.<ref>[http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?eo20010719a2.htm Biased history helps feed U.S. fascination with Pearl Harbor] Retrieved November 25, 2007.</ref>
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| − |
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| − | In putting the Pearl Harbor attack into context, Japanese writers repeatedly contrast the thousands of U.S. servicemen killed there with the hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians killed in U.S. air attacks later in the War,<ref>[http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/geted.pl5?eo20010625hs.htm The View From New York: Debunking America's 'Good War' myth] Retrieved November 25, 2007.</ref> even without mentioning the 1945 [[atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki]] by the United States.
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| − |
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| − | However, in spite of the perceived inevitability of the war by many Japanese, many also believe the Pearl Harbor attack, although a tactical victory, was actually part of a seriously flawed strategy for engaging in war with the U.S. As one columnist eulogizes, "The Pearl Harbor attack was a brilliant tactic, but part of a strategy based on the belief that a spirit as firm as iron and as beautiful as cherry blossoms could overcome the materially wealthy United States. That strategy was flawed, and Japan's total defeat would follow."<ref>[http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?fl20040208x3.htm The War's Leagacy [sic]: Dawn of a tragic era] Retrieved November 25, 2007.</ref>
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| − | In 1991, the Japanese Foreign Ministry released a statement saying Japan had intended to make a formal [[declaration of war]] to the United States at 1 p.m. Washington time, 25 minutes before the attack at Pearl Harbor was scheduled to begin. This officially acknowledged something that had been publicly known for years. Diplomatic communications had been coordinated well in advance with the attack, but had failed delivery at the intended time. It appears the Japanese government was referring to the "14-part message," which did not actually break off negotiations, let alone declare war, but did officially raise the possibility of a break in relations. However, because of various delays, the Japanese ambassador was unable to make the declaration until well after the attack had begun.
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| − |
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| − | Imperial Japanese military leaders appear to have had mixed feelings about the attack. [[Fleet Admiral]] [[Isoroku Yamamoto]] was unhappy about the botched timing of the breaking off of negotiations. He is rumored to have said, "[[Isoroku Yamamoto's sleeping giant quote|I fear all we have done is awakened a sleeping giant and filled him with terrible resolve]]." Even though this quote is unsubstantiated, the phrase seems to describe his feelings about the situation. He is on record as having said, in the previous year, that "I can run wild for six months ... after that, I have no expectation of success."<ref>Spector, Ronald H. ''Eagle against the Sun The American War with Japan''. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1984. ISBN 9780029303603</ref>
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| − |
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| − | The first [[Prime Minister of Japan]] during World War II, [[Hideki Tojo]] later wrote,
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| − | "When reflecting upon it today, that the Pearl Harbor attack should have succeeded in achieving surprise seems a blessing from Heaven."
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| − |
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| − | Yamamoto had said, regarding the imminent war with the United States, "Should hostilities once break out between [[Japan]] and the [[United States]], it is not enough that we take [[Guam]] and the [[Philippines]], nor even [[Hawaii]] and [[San Francisco]]. We would have to march into [[Washington DC|Washington]] and sign the treaty in the [[White House]]. I wonder if our politicians (who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war) have confidence as to the outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices?" <ref>[http://plasma.nationalgeographic.com/pearlharbor/ngbeyond/people/people11.html National Geographic mini-biography of [[Isoroku Yamamoto]] ] Retrieved November 25, 2007.</ref>
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| − |
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| − | ==Impact==
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| − | [[Image:Ww2 pearl harbor resolve poster.jpg|thumb|222px|right|Posters like Allen Saalberg's iconic work strengthed American resolve against the Axis powers]]
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| − |
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| − | A common view is that the Japanese fell victim to [[victory disease]] because of the perceived ease of their first victories. It has also been stated by the Japanese military commanders and politicians who visited and lived in the United States, that their leadership (mostly military personnel) took the war with the United States relatively lightly. In addition to Yamamoto, [[Battle of Iwo Jima]] commander [[Tadamichi Kuribayashi]]'s opinions expressed the views and concerns about the greater industrial power of the United States in comparison to Japan.
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| − |
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| − | Despite the perception of this battle as a devastating blow to America, only three ships were permanently lost to the U.S. Navy. These were the battleships [[USS Arizona (BB-39)|''Arizona'']], [[USS Oklahoma (BB-37)|''Oklahoma'']], and the old battleship [[USS Utah (BB-31)|''Utah'']] (then used as a target ship); nevertheless, much usable material was salvaged from them, including the two aft main turrets from ''Arizona''. Heavy casualties resulted from ''Arizona’''s magazine exploding and the ''Oklahoma'' capsizing. Four ships sunk during the attack were later raised and returned to duty, including the battleships [[USS California (BB-44)|''California'']], [[USS West Virginia (BB-48)|''West Virginia'']] and [[USS Nevada (BB-36)|''Nevada'']]. ''California'' and ''West Virginia'' had an effective torpedo-defense system which held up remarkably well, despite the weight of fire they had to endure, resulting in most of their crews being saved. Many of the surviving battleships were heavily refitted, including the replacement of their outdated secondary battery of anti-surface 5 inch (127 mm) guns with more useful turreted dual-purpose (antiaircraft and antiship) guns, allowing them to better cope with the new tactical reality. In fact, their rate of fire was too low to deal with aircraft, as experience with ''[[kamikaze]]'' would demonstrate. Not until the introduction of a fully automatic 3 inch {76 mm} postwar was a suitable solution found. Addition of modern [[radar]] to the salvaged vessels would give them a marked qualitative advantage over those of the IJN, and the slow battleships (incapable of operating with carrier task forces, unlike the [[USS Iowa (BB-61)|''Iowa'']]s) would prove useful delivering pre-invasion bombardment for the [[island hopping]] offensive against the Japanese in the pacific. Destroyers [[USS Cassin (DD-372)|''Cassin'']] and [[USS Downes (DD-375)|''Downes'']] were total losses as ships, but their machinery was salvaged and fitted into new hulls, retaining their original names, while ''Shaw'' was raised and returned to service.
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| − | Of the 22 Japanese ships that took part in the attack, only one survived the war. As of 2006, the only U.S. ships in Pearl Harbor during the attack still remaining afloat are the [[USCGC Taney (WHEC-37)|Coast Guard Cutter ''Taney'']] and the yard tug [[USS Hoga (YT-146)|USS ''Hoga'']]. Both remained active over 50 years after the attack and have been designated museum ships.
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| − |
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| − | In the long term, the attack on Pearl Harbor was a strategic [[blunder]] for Japan. Indeed, Admiral Yamamoto, who conceived it, predicted that even success here could not win a war with the United States, because American productive capacity was too large. One of the main Japanese objectives was to destroy the three American [[aircraft carrier]]s stationed in the Pacific, but they were not present: ''Enterprise'' was returning from Wake, ''Lexington'' from Midway, and ''Saratoga'' was under refit at [[Puget Sound Naval Shipyard]]. Putting most of the U.S. battleships out of commission was regarded—in both navies and by most military observers worldwide—as a tremendous success for Japan.
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| − | Though the attack was notable for its large-scale destruction, the attack was not significant for American fuel storage, maintenance and intelligence capabilities. Had Japan destroyed the American carriers, the U.S. would have sustained significant damage to the Pacific Fleet's ability to conduct offensive operations for a year or so (given no further diversions from the Atlantic Fleet). As it was, the elimination of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice but to place its faith in aircraft carriers and submarines–the very weapons with which the U.S. Navy halted and eventually reversed the Japanese advance. A major flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a belief the ultimate Pacific battle would be between battleships of both sides, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain [[Alfred Mahan]]. As a result, Yamamoto (and his successors) hoarded his battleships for a "decisive battle" that never happened.
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| − |
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| − | Ultimately, targets not on Genda's list, such as the Submarine Base and the old Headquarters Building, were more important than any battleship. It was submarines that immobilized IJN's heavy ships and brought Japan's economy to a standstill by crippling transportation of oil and raw materials. And in the basement of the old Administration Building was the cryptanalytic unit, <small>HYPO</small>, which contributed significantly to the Midway ambush and the Submarine Force's success.
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| − |
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| − | ===Rise of anti-Japanese sentiment and historical significance===
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| − | {{main|Anti-Japanese sentiment}}
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| − | [[Image:PropagandaHitlerTojo.jpg|thumb|right|right|United States WW2 [[propaganda]] poster depicting [[Adolf Hitler]] and [[Hideki Tojo]].]]
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| − | The attack on Pearl Harbor coupled with Japanese alliance with the [[Nazis]] and the ensuing war in the Pacific fueled [[anti-Japanese sentiment]], [[racism]], [[xenophobia]] and anti-Axis sentiment in the Allied nations. It resulted in internment of Japanese, German and Italian populations in the United States and others, for instance the [[Japanese American internment]] and [[German American internment]]. It resulted in the United States fighting the Germans and Italians among others in Europe and Japan in the west. [[Japanese people|Japanese]], [[Japanese-Americans]] and [[Asia]]ns having a similar physical appearance were regarded with deep seated suspicion, distrust and hostility. The attack was viewed as having been conducted in an extremely underhanded way, as a very "treacherous" or "sneaky attack." The war ended with the first and last [[nuclear war]] as the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan. Later Germany surrendered after Adolf Hitler committed suicide when its capital Berlin was overrun by the [[Red Army]].
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| − | [[Image:Pearl az.jpg|thumb|left|''Arizona'' [[barbette]], 2005.]]
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| − | The attack had history-altering consequences. [[Prime Minister]] [[Winston Churchill]], on hearing of the attack, wrote, "Being saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful."<ref>{{cite book| first=Winston| last=Churchill| title=The Second World War, Vol. 3| pages=539}}</ref> By opening the Pacific War, which ended in the [[unconditional surrender]] of Japan, it broke the power of an Asian check on [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] expansion. The Allied victory in this war and subsequent U.S. emergence as a dominant world power, eclipsing Britain, has shaped international politics ever since.
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| − |
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| − | [[Image:Bullet holes at headquarters building of Hickam Air Force Base.jpg|thumb|left|Damage to the headquarters building at Hickam, still visible.]]
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| − |
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| − | Pearl Harbor is generally regarded as an extraordinary event in American history, remembered as the first time since the [[War of 1812]] America was attacked on its [[homeland|home soil]] by another country. While this assertion is technically erroneous, as Hawaii was not a state at the time, it was widely regarded as "home soil." It was the first decisive defeat for the United States in [[World War II]]. It has become synonymous with "surprise attack" ever since in the U.S.
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| − |
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| − | ==Notes==
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| − | <references/>
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| − |
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| − | ==References==
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| − | <div class="references-small">
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| − | * [[McCollum memo]] A 1940 memo from a Naval headquarters staff officer to his superiors outlining possible provocations to Japan, which might lead to war (declassified in 1994).
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| − | * [[Gordon W. Prange]], ''At Dawn We Slept'', McGraw-Hill, 1981. ISBN 9780070506695 ''Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History'', McGraw-Hill, 1986. ISBN 9780140159097 and ''December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor'', McGraw-Hill, 1988. ISBN 9780070506824 This monumental trilogy, written with collaborators Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, is considered the authoritative work on the subject.
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| − | * Larry Kimmett and Margaret Regis, ''[http://www.navpublishing.com/index.htm The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History]'' (NavPublishing, 2004). Using maps, photos, unique illustrations, and an animated CD, this book provides a detailed overview of the surprise attack that brought the United States into World War II.
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| − | * [[Walter Lord]], ''Day of Infamy'', Henry Holt, 2001. ISBN 9780805068030 is a very readable, and entirely anecdotal, re-telling of the day's events.
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| − | * W. J. Holmes, ''Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II'', Naval Institute, 1979. ISBN 9780870211621 contains some important material, such as Holmes' argument that, had the U.S. Navy been warned of the attack and put to sea, it would have likely resulted in an even greater disaster.
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| − | * Michael V. Gannon, ''Pearl Harbor Betrayed'', Henry Holt, 2001. ISBN 9780805066982 is a recent examination of the issues surrounding the surprise of the attack.
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| − | * Frederick D. Parker, ''[http://www.history.navy.mil/books/comint/ Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941]'' (Center for Cryptologic History, 1994) contains a detailed description of what the Navy knew from intercepted and decrypted Japan's communications prior to Pearl.
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| − | * Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, ''Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment'', New York: Crown, 1992. ISBN 9780517586440 an account of the secret "[[Clausen Inquiry]]" undertaken late in the war by order of Congress to Secretary of War [[Stimson]].
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| − | * [[Robert A. Theobald]], ''Final Secret of Pearl Harbor'' (Devin-Adair Pub, 1954) ISBN 0-8159-5503-0 ISBN 0-317-65928-6 Foreword by Fleet Admiral [[William F. Halsey, Jr.]]
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| − | * [[Albert Coady Wedemeyer|Albert C. Wedemeyer]], ''Wedemeyer Reports!'' (Henry Holt Co, 1958) ISBN 0-89275-011-1 ISBN 0-8159-7216-4
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| − | * [[Hamilton Fish]], ''Tragic Deception: FDR and America's Involvement in World War II'' (Devin-Adair Pub, 1983) ISBN 0-8159-6917-1
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| − | * John Toland, ''Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath'' (Berkley Reissue edition, 1986 ISBN 0-425-09040-X) is an excellent account by a Pulitzer Prize winning author, though thought by some not to back up his claims as thoroughly as expected by academic conventions.
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| − | * [[Robert Stinnett]], ''[http://www.pearlharbor41.com/ Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor]'' (Free Press, 1999) A study of the Freedom of Information Act documents that led Congress to direct clearance of Kimmel and Short. ISBN 0-7432-0129-9
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| − | * [[Edward L. Beach]], ''Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor''ISBN 1-55750-059-2
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| − | *Andrew Krepinevich, {{PDFlink|[http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/R.20020225.Lighting_the_Path_/R.20020225.Lighting_the_Path_.pdf]|186 [[Kibibyte|KiB]]<!-- application/pdf, 191262 bytes —>}} ''(Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments)'' contains a passage regarding the Yarnell attack, as well as reference citations.
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| − | * Roberta Wohlstetter, ''Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision'', (Stanford University Press: 1962). ISBN 9780804705981 Regarded by many as the most important work in the attempt to understand the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. Her introduction and analysis of the concept of "noise" persists in understanding intelligence failures.
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| − | * John Hughes-Wilson, ''Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups''. Robinson, 1999 (revised 2004). ISBN 9780786713738 Contains a brief but insightful chapter on the particular intelligence failures, and broader overview of what causes them.
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| − | *{{cite book
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| − | | last = Horn
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| − | | first = Steve
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| − | | authorlink =
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| − | | coauthors =
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| − | | year = 2005
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| − | | chapter =
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| − | | title = The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor: Operation K And Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America in World War II
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| − | | publisher = Naval Institute Press
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| − | | location =
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| − | | id = ISBN 1-59114-388-8
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| − | }}
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| − | </div>
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| − | * {{cite book
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| − | | last = Seki
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| − | | first = Eiji
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| − | | coauthors =
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| − | | year = 2007
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| − | | title = Sinking of the SS Automedon And the Role of the Japanese Navy: A New Interpretation
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| − | | publisher = University of Hawaii Press
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| − | | location =
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| − | | id = ISBN 1905246285
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| − |
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| − | }}
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| − |
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| − | * Daniel Madsen, ''Resurrection-Salvaging the Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor''. U.S. Naval Institute Press. 2003. ISBN 9781557504883 Highly readable and thoroughly researched account of the aftermath of the attack and the salvage efforts from December 8, 1941 through early 1944.
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| − |
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| − | ==External links==
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| − | All links Retrieved November 22, 2007.
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| − |
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| − | * [http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/Guard-US/ch7.htm Guarding The United States And Its Outposts] Official U.S. Army history of Pearl Harbor
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| − | * [http://starbulletin.com/1999/09/13/special/index.html War comes to Hawaii] ''Honolulu Star-Bulletin'', Monday, Sept. 13, 1999
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| − | * [http://www.navpublishing.com/phtour1.htm Tour the Pearl Harbor Attack] Graphical tour of the Attack on Pearl Harbor
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| − | * [http://www.umkc.edu/lib/spec-col/ww2/PearlHarbor/fdr-speech.htm Roosevelt's Day Of Infamy Speech] Audio of speech given by President Roosevelt shortly after Pearl Harbor Attack
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| − | * [http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/pearlhbr.htm U.S. Naval Historical Center] "Pearl Harbor Raid: Overview and Special Image Selection"
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| − | * [http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/afcphhtml/afcphhome.html Library of Congress: The day after]
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| − | * [http://uscg.mil/history/Pearl_Harbor_Index.html US Coast Guard at Pearl Harbor attack December 7, 1941]
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| − | * [http://www.worldwar-two.net/acontecimentos/130/ Second World War - USA Declaration of War on Japan.]
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| − | * [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/097/index.html Collection of extensive Japanese preparation military documents]
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| − | * [http://www.usni.org/resources/pearlharbor/pearlharbor.htm Naval Institute Special Collections: Pearl Harbor]—Articles, books, and pictures.
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| − | * [http://ibiblio.org/pha/pha Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings] Detailed reports from various investigations.
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| − | * [http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/EastWind/index.html Pearl Harbor Attack at HyperWar]
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| − | * [http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/campaign/2/0 Information and Photographs on the Attack on Pearl Harbor at WWII Archives]
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| − | *[http://groups.msn.com/japanesemodelaircraft/technintelpearlharbor.msnw?Page=1 Pearl Harbor website]
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| − | {{World War II}}
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| − | {{coor title dm|21|22|N|157|57|W|}}
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| − | [[category:Politics and social sciences]]
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| − | [[category:Politics]]
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| − | {{credits|167436447}}
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